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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF  ENLARGEMENT 
Jacques PELKMANS* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Eastern enlargement is about to be decided by the European Council. 
As expected,  the “end game “ of the negotiations and assessments is heavily 
biased by a narrow perspective on net transfers, on income compensations to 
Central European farmers and on the psychological politics of a single “big bang 
“. None of these three so-called key items of the end game are of much 
relevance to appreciate the significance of enlargement. Net transfers have little 
to do with the costs and benefits of club membership for countries which pay, 
and can lead to addiction and lethargy rather than extra growth if market 
integration, macro-economic stability and domestic reforms are not taken 
serious (as the case of Greece before 1997 has demonstrated). Income 
compensations for Eastern farmers are crucial for this pressure group, and 
symbolically of some importance in domestic politics because of the perversity 
that rich farmers get more, but their absence is likely to serve the public interest 
in candidate countries far better. And being part of the big bang, as against 
getting in one or three years later, has assumed a dramatic meaning during this 
end game, far beyond its true proportions. This hectic European theatre tends to 
obscure what enlargement is mainly about, now that the stability and values 
have been secured for the peoples from Central Europe. In a guaranteed setting 
of peace, freedom and security, enlargement is about greater prosperity. 
 
It is therefore essential that the economic implications of enlargement are 
better appreciated by policy makers. It is the purpose of this Bruges 
European Economic Policy (BEEP) briefing to provide an accessible 
overview of the economic implications of enlargement as a help for 
advisors and decision makers.  The survey is not meant to be exhaustive 
and avoids technical exposition. Policy implications are drawn throughout 
the briefing. The presentation shies away from the much discussed reform 
details of the CAP and from the budgetary aspects, including who pays 
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(net) and who receives (net). Similarly, the debate on the transfers related 
to cohesion after 2006 is not reviewed. The briefing is purposefully 
focussing on “other “ economic effects  that tend to get lost in the current 
debate and which are more fundamental for the secular rise of prosperity. 
 
 Section 2 deals with the conventional economic impact analysis of 
enlargement.  This approach is dominated by the trade effects, starting from the 
idea that enlargement is primarily a customs union issue.  This trade-based 
literature is rich and I shall limit myself to the key conclusions while respecting 
to some degree the analytical differentiation.  A part of this literature is 
combined with pro-competitive effects or even truly dynamic effects and has 
frequently been extended to the impact on GDP for the medium-run.  
Selectively,  the shortcomings of these analyses will be mentioned.  The greatest 
weakness, however, is that the starting point should not be the usual one of 
moving from a tariff-ridden initial situation to a customs union, but from free 
trade area to a customs union, and indeed one with high tariffs only for 
agriculture and maximum tariffs in the 9% - 12% range  for a few industrial 
sectors.  Other EU tariffs have nuisance value or are zero. Going beyond this 
trade –driven perspective will therefore require a very different framework. 
 
 In this BEEP briefing I shall look at enlargement as ‘regime change’ and 
study its wide-ranging economic implications.  In 5 subsequent sections I shall 
discuss a selection of economic implications of ‘regime change’:  does it help 
catch-up growth?; does it help the inflow of foreign direct investment?; does it 
lead to more than trivial migration from East to West?; what are the economic 
implications of the candidates joining monetary union ? Finally, I shall briefly 
touch upon three kinds of EU reforms, the need for which is strengthened by 
enlargement. As noted, this leaves out many other aspects,1 even the budget and 
the Zahlmeister issue.  An obsession with net payments to the EU forms an 
unhealthy denial of what economic integration is all about.  For readers 
interested in the economics and estimates of the net-paying vs. net-receiving 
countries and the shifts therein, I refer to other sources (see Weise, 2002; 
Pelkmans, Gros & Nunez-Ferrer, 2000; European Commission, 2002). The 
briefing ends with a summary of the conclusions.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Such as domestic reforms in candidate countries, a range of typical enlargement issues having economic effects 
(e.g. Schengen frontiers, WTO approval, environment, etc.), institutions in candidates post-transition (key for 
growth) including ‘social capital’, and the Convention; one could also include the mere assumption of whether or 
not Turkey comes in as it is economically bigger than all candidates together and has overlapping structures. 
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2. Trade-induced impact 
 
The pure trade effects of enlargement are first of all the result of a change 
from an industrial free trade area towards a customs union including agriculture.  
However, beyond this textbook case, the candidates enter the internal market 
and this introduces additional potential benefits which are hard to model 
properly.  If tariff differentials in a free trade area are modest and tariffs are 
absolutely low, the change-over to a low-CET customs union should not be 
expected to cause large changes.  Thus, for industry, most of the adjustment 
driven by the free access to the EU goods market will be over before 2004.  
What then follows might be characterised by further deepening of specialisation 
and vertical intra-industry trade, stimulated by foreign direct investment and 
sub-contracting.  This is best demonstrated by the textile & clothing industry, 
the biggest sector of the candidate countries in EU imports and showing double 
digit growth rates for over a decade now, with no sign of abating.  With the end 
of MFA quotas nearing (2005) German and Italian industry have developed 
strategies for relocation and expansion in Central Europe for as long as a decade 
ahead (EPPA/CEPS, 2002).  The impact is more complicated in the car sector, 
the only major sector where the candidates’ protection is strong, hence where 
current EU-CEEC trade incorporates significant trade diversion.  Thus, the 
restored  trade balance in cars in what will be EU-25 is only sustainable if 
technical efficiency and/or improvements in technology have important cost-
reducing effects, at the required level of quality for sales in Western Europe.  In 
Poland and later, Romania, this will require impressive improvements in applied 
technology, the quality of supplier networks and other aspects of cost 
minimisation as well as quality. The trade effects will be by far the most 
important in agriculture. In agriculture the initial protection by the EU was very 
high, with only limited exceptions and minimal quotas, whereas the candidates’ 
agro-protection turned out to be much lower but, more often than not, not low 
absolutely. This spells complex and sizeable trade diversion effects. Of course 
such effects should not be studied in a static context because the sector, already 
plagued by cumbersome land privatisation  and dual systems of tiny, 
unproductive and very large farms, is up for drastic restructuring and 
technological change. Moreover, the nature of the CAP which the EU-15 will 
“export”  to the candidates is not yet known. The present briefing does not deal 
with agriculture although occasional references cannot entirely be avoided  (for 
readers interested in the expected trade effects in agriculture  can consult e.g. 
Fuller et. al, 2002; Weyerbrock, 1998; Frandsen, Jensen & Vanzetti, 2000; 
Swinnen, 2002; European Commission, 2002a; idem, 2002b). 
 
The empirical literature on trade effects generally deals with the impact of 
today’s free trade area  (the Europe Agreements) and much less with the post-
2004 customs union.  Some of the more telling inferences about the CECs 
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(Central European Candidates) include that, after the massive shift towards trade 
with the EU (up to 1994), the initial dominance of labour-intensive final goods 
has reduced, and the share of technology and skilled-labour intensive products 
moved up from 37% in 1993 to 50% in 1997 (Kaminsky, 2001). Quality 
upgrading is also found by Nielsen (2001), at a very high level of 
disaggregation, but the CEEC quality levels still lag greatly behind those of the 
EU.  Vertical intra-industry trade dominates East-West industrial trade 
(Aturupane, Djankov & Hoekman, 1999), with the CEECs invariably supplying 
the low unit-cost goods.  The impact side of Central Europe is extremely 
dynamic for capital goods (not including motor vehicles and their parts), nearly 
a tripling between 1993 and 1998.  These and other studies, combined with the 
flows of foreign direct investment, point to ongoing forceful restructuring and 
upgrading.  It is guesswork to make inferences about the quality of factor 
endowments and applied technology in 2004 but there are good reasons to 
expect the starting position in the larger customs union to be radically different 
from the empirical basis of most of the meanwhile published literature on trade 
effects.  If correct, it is good news for competitiveness, and ultimately catch-up 
growth.  In any event, a reasonable guess would be that the candidates’ share in 
EU-15 imports (already gone up from 3.4% in 1992 to 9.8% in 1999) would rise 
to 13% - 14% by the time of entry.  Central Europe will begin to matter in EU 
trade. 
 
It is far from obvious how to connect this combination of trade growth 
and structural change with the static theory of preferential trading.  It would 
seem much more attractive to assume a richer approach in which the so-called 
pro-competitive effects, in models with scale (hence, restructuring via exit of 
firms) and product differentiation, and possibly capital movements, are 
accounted for.   An example is in Francois (1998) who also allows for (re-) 
location effects of footloose industries and endogenous capital stocks, so that 
accumulation effects can be included in a computable general equilibrium 
model.  As is to be expected, the economic impact on the EU is slight but 
positive.  For the candidates, the static efficiency gains are positive but 
completely overwhelmed by the procompetitive and accumulation effects, on the 
basis of drastic restructuring in Central Europe and some relocation from West 
to East.  In actual reality, this will take place against the backdrop of 
considerable, structural unemployment and inevitably large adjustment costs at 
least in the short-run, reducing the initial net gains appreciably.  In such richer 
approaches, sectoral shifts tend to get lost or evened out.  In Lejour, de Mooij & 
Nahuis (2001), a brave attempt, with a complex CGE model, is made to estimate 
effects for 16 sectors.  This paper is one of the very few in which the post-2004 
regime is stylised by (largely) ignoring tariffs. The authors identify, with a 
gravity approach, the tariff equivalents of regulatory barriers in the internal 
market (which can only fade away after adaptation, quality upgrading and 
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recognised conformity assessment).  With this ingenious, though problematic 
procedure, the authors can show pronounced output increases (after 2004) for 
sectors such as textiles & leather (between 34 % and 52%), electronic equipment 
(between 8% and 70%) and transport equipment (between 30% and 68%).   The 
implied regulatory barriers (between 10% and 17% for the key sectors) should 
be related to ‘regime change’ in the framework of the PECA agreements with 
the candidates, the industrial equivalent of the infrastructural capacity to 
conform to sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements.  However, it is one-sided 
to regard regulatory barriers only as costs, since, broadly speaking, these 
requirements accord well with quality indicators for competitiveness. 
 
 How these trade effects translate into welfare gains, or GDP gains for the 
initial period has been actively studied.  There are essentially three approaches 
here.  One is the use of CGE models (aimed at welfare gains) which tend to be 
theoretically well-founded, yet more often than not based on highly unrealistic 
assumptions, and many parameters are given arbitrary values for the calibration 
to fit  (e.g. Keuschnigg & Kohler (1999); Baldwin, Francois & Porter (1997)). A 
second one is to impute basic trade findings into a macroeconomic model and 
calculate GDP effects (e.g. Rosati (2000); Breuss (1999)). A third way is a more 
strategic approach for development, which emphasises gradual improvements of 
value-added in vertical intra-industry trade, the attraction of foreign direct 
investment to accelerate just that or to widen the competitive product base and 
raising productivity more generally via competitive exposure, steady investment 
and skill-upgrading.  Trade then allows candidates to climb the ladder of 
dynamic comparative advantages, eventually spurred by wage increases and 
currency appreciation (e.g. OECD (1998); Porter & Christensen (1999); Brenton 
(1999)).  
 
 Trade-induced simulations typically show that the EU gains trivially and 
that the candidates as a group gain anywhere from 1 ½% to 8% or even 10% of 
GDP in the short to medium run.  The lower bound is usually the result of 
explicit deduction of adjustment costs.   This range hides large analytical 
differences of approaches and should at best be considered as a rough 
approximation.  One example can illustrate this.  Several articles (e.g. Baldwin, 
Francois & Porter, 1997) have included an arbitrary reduction of the risk 
premium in the interest rate for capital movements and this tends to enlarge the 
gains considerably. 
 
Another warning is that a number of simulations in the literature come 
with GDP-related gains but not primarily trade-induced.  Thus, the much quoted 
paper by the European Commission (2001) stipulating extra annual GDP growth 
of 1.3% to 2.1% for the 8 accession countries joining in 2004, critically depends 
on growth accounting in a Solow-type framework.  It assumed, on the basis of a 
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perhaps plausible but largely intuitive reasoning that pro-growth policies in a 
steady reform strategy in Central Europe will boost total factor productivity and 
the capital stock. 
 
This rapid excursion into trade-induced effects is silent about services.  
Although we live in a service economy, with nearly 70% of GDP arising from 
service activities, studies only deal with agriculture and industry.  Services have 
swiftly risen in importance in Central Europe, yet, East-West services trade 
under the Europe Agreements is very small.  The internal market will imply at 
least two shocks:  first, some degree of cross-border services will emerge, with 
opportunities for selected service providers in the candidates; second, in 
regulated services sectors such as road haulage and financial services, home 
country control will have to be applied, which may increase competitive 
exposure to local services.   In network services the uncertainty is even greater, 
with monopolies in telecoms only being phased out now, and e.g. energy prices 
still regulated at the retail level. 
 
 
3. Catch-up or catch-22? 
 
The appreciation of fundamental values such as respect for human rights, 
democracy and security against tyranny does not imply that the peoples of 
Central Europe were not aspiring to achieve the prosperity levels of Western 
Europe. Indeed, for most Central Europeans and their governments, catch-up 
growth and EU membership are more or less synonymous, certainly once the 
attainment of values seems secured. It is therefore far more important to offer 
reliable advice about strategies for steady catch-up growth in Central Europe 
than to produce yet another study on the trade –related impact of enlargement 
(except for agriculture where the actual policy regime matters so much). Can 
economists be helpful guides to get candidates on a trendpath of catch-up 
growth?  
 
Let us first celebrate the good news.  After the large output falls of the 
beginning of transition, the candidates have shown that rather basic 
recommendations about sound economic policy, combined with the gradual 
introduction of the acquis communautaire and the access to the EU markets, 
does bring catch-up growth. Between 1995 and 2000, 7 of the 10 CECs were 
catching up despite Russian turbulence and lingering transition problems. And 
the cases of retrogression were clearly countries paying the price of half-baked 
reforms and/or very sloppy macro-economic policies (Bulgaria, Romania and 
the Czech Republic). All three are in the process of overcoming these setbacks, 
with Romania and Bulgaria currently on a catch-up rate of 2 % - 3 % points or 
more (if the EU remains trapped  at a miserable 1 % this year). However, the 
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real issue is a long-run one: does the Union welcome the growth dynamo’s of 
the near future or must it face the risk of getting stuck with a bunch of new 
Mezzogiorno’s?  In other words: how to escape from catch-22  and foster catch-
up with the West ?  Recent extrapolations of the post – 1995 experience suggests 
that catch-up to only 75 % of the GDP per capita of the EU-15 will take one, 
two or three decades dependent on the country and ignoring the relatively high 
income case of Slovenia.  
 
The Commission and many other policy makers are already enmeshed in 
the domestic micro and macro economic policy debates of the candidates, at first 
via so-called Joint Assessments, subsequently via Pre-accession Economic 
Programmes (aimed at fiscal sustainability) and soon via the various economic 
coordination mechanisms of EMU, especially the formulation of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines where candidates will act as if they are members. 
In addition, general principles of the treaty (what in Germany is called 
“Ordnungspolitik “) and the obligation to enter monetary union sooner or later, 
hence the compliance with the Maastricht criteria and the overall stability 
culture of Euroland, are important beacons for the fundamentals. The acquis is 
already constraining politicians in not regulating markets the wrong way.  
Support programmes and the structural funds after 2004 are widely expected to 
help infrastructure and the costly environmental investment directives, even if 
the efficiency of these programmes is below standard. This mighty combination 
of  “lock in “ and policy stimulus, not to speak of the dynamic benefits of 
market access and competitive exposure in an EU – 25, generates a pro-growth 
environment. It is not comparable to East Germany where irresponsible wage 
increases far ahead of productivity and a lack of local ownership, combined with 
what Rudy Dornbusch called both the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ institutions of Germany, 
have prolonged structural unemployment and deterred investors. It is not 
comparable to industrializing developing countries in general as they cannot 
hope to enjoy such forceful ‘lock in ‘ (not even Mexico in NAFTA), such strong 
guidance in economic policy, such powerful and long term assistance and such 
market access, indeed free  movement  (implying a right to access).  
 
Nevertheless, the favourable environment notwithstanding, there are 
lingering doubts about catch-up growth. They have both practical and deep 
analytical grounds.  Practical arguments include the egalitarian inclination in the 
domestic politics of the transition countries, which has caused intolerably high 
social mark-ups on wages (not seldomly higher than in Western Europe, which 
used to be the highest in the OECD) and considerable deficits in the pensions 
systems today (i.e. before ageing is beginning to hit). Other worrying 
observations  include  the hesitation to go all the way in restructuring of ailing 
sectors in the presence of high structural unemployment, the deep skill 
mismatches of many long-term unemployed in a rapidly changing labour market 
 9
and  the expected exit from agriculture with a questionable absorption capacity 
of industry and services, the alternative being a too generous CAP keeping far 
too many human resources in subsistence agriculture, dragging down growth. 
Last but not least, one could add the weaknesses in financial services and capital 
markets in actually serving the needs of local investors at low interest rates and 
the overall fear that implementation and market related institutions in Central 
Europe are so feeble that markets suffer from uncertainty, hence less growth.  
 
The analytical reasons boil down to the controversies in economics about 
the long term determinants of growth. The empirical convergence literature has 
brought quite some confusion  (see for a rich survey in the context of 
enlargement, UN-ECE, 2001). A careful application with parameters taken 
directly from Central Europe shows that these empirical models are not at all 
robust (e.g. Campos, 2000). In any event these determinants are rather rough, 
such as simple enrolment rates as a measure of human capital and  (as a 
negative) the share of government consumption in GDP. Broader development 
strategies a la Porter (Porter  & Chistensen (1999))  may be more insightful, yet 
tend to have a less rigorous basis. Also the debate on the East Asian miracle has 
ended in controversy on several major determinants (IBRD (1993); 
Eggleton (1997); Morrisey & Nelson (1998); ADB  (1997; ADB (1999, 
part III)) such as the nature and degree of government intervention (including 
the quality of economic institutions) and the relevance of intensive versus 
extensive (i.e. based on volume expansion of factor input) growth. The 
consensus on a strong emphasis on human capital development and macro-
economic stability is not particularly helpful because this is a widespread 
conviction anyway in Europe. Finally, the recent analytical underpinnings of the 
convergence /divergence debate for the reform of cohesion policy in the Union 
have led to great theoretical advances in the new economic geography (see 
Fujita, Krugman & Venables (1999) and Neary (2001)) but significant 
difficulties remain in translating it into policy recommendations as the authors 
themselves admit. In other words, as the Romanian economist (and former 
finance minister) Daniel Daianu  (2002) has put it, should we rely on “an 
apparent mythical belief “  in EU circles   that    a well functioning competitive 
market economy will ensure a catch-up growth trajectory ? Can Ireland be 
imitated by all or will many mimick the Greek tragedy before 1997 or are they 
capable of pursuing the reasonable Iberian middle-road? It seems obvious to this 
author that the EU can simply no longer tolerate the pre-1997 Greek 
underperformance combined with opportunism and bad implementation. EMU 
is a huge improvement in that respect and Greece has responded in kind.  
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4. Investment inflows after privatisation 
 
Foreign direct investment (= FDI) has several positive effects on the 
economic performance of the candidates such as a direct contribution to growth, 
an indirect one via interfirm spill-overs especially where supplier networks are 
largely regional and have to be upgraded, a direct competitive exposure which 
(after allowing for exit) will stimulate higher productivity, the transfer of 
technology and other worldclass  practices  and, at the macro level, the reduction 
of the balance of payments constraint for constant levels of savings in Central 
Europe. As Brenton & di Mauro (1999) have shown, FDI in the more advanced 
candidates was greater than one should expect given the actual level of income, 
market size and relative proximity. The determinants of future  FDI flows into 
Central Europe are perhaps even more difficult to establish than elsewhere. 
Bevan & Estrin (2000) find as key determinants country risk, unit labour cost, 
host country size and other gravity factors. In turn, country risk is influenced by 
private sector development, industrial development, budget (im)balance, 
reserves and the degree of corruption. They show that more FDI boosts credit 
ratings with a lag, which in turn boost FDI again. This suggests virtuous circles 
but also rivalry in attracting FDI between the lagging and advanced candidates. 
Thus, it raises the possibility of vicious circles for the former which would 
increase the difficulties of attaining catch-up growth.  
 
One can query, however, whether empirical analysis about the 1990s is a 
good guide to understand future FDI under EU membership. First, the infamous 
“business climate” is in a state of flux although broadly in the right direction. 
Second, the past is no guide since the bulk of the larger acquisitions were part 
and parcel of the privatisation process.  To a limited extent one should expect 
‘vertical FDI ‘ responding to the different relative factor endowments  than 
Western Europe (or other OECD countries) such as in clothing, leather, metal 
working and household equipment. Horizontal FDI however responds strongly 
to market size and density (indeed, high income consumers  and proximity to 
clients and suppliers) and therefore interacts with catch-up growth. The 
perception or expectation that chances for long-run catch-up growth are good 
will act as a major stimulus for FDI which in turn will contribute to the 
realisation of that economic growth. It is for this reason that business attaches so 
much significance to actual, not possible, EU membership (ERT (1999); ERT 
(2001)). They regard the EU as a credible – even when far from perfect  -  
enforcer and stabiliser of the regime change and wish to see the seal of approval. 
The Spanish and Portuguese accession led to a true explosion of FDI inflows for 
about four years, before returning to 1986 levels. Note that the data are seriously 
deficient here because one ought to incorporate reinvested earnings in the 
inflows but they were not recorded in those days. It is not improbable that local 
investments by foreign establishments would improve the picture also after 
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1991. One might add that the subsequent entry into Euroland would further 
boost FDI although little hard empirical work seems to underpin this 
expectation. Soft indications for this statement include the massive business 
support for the euro precisely on the grounds of predictability and low long term 
interest rates. This can be traced to  deep-seated business fears for exchange rate 
volatility  before and during ERM 2, given their  disillusion caused by  the 
1992/93 EMS crisis. In so far as FDI is related to a deepening of division of 
labour between West and East in the EU 25, the fragmentation of the value 
chain over a range of countries enhances the vulnerability of profits and strategy 
to currency misalignments or even ‘contagion ‘ in case of a major financial 
crisis. On the other hand, an important part of FDI actually goes to services in 
Central Europe and it is not immediately obvious how EU or Euroland 
membership as distinct from local opportunities would  stimulate such 
investments. An argument that tends to be overlooked is the stability of market 
access and of currencies inside Central Europe. After the collapse of Comecon 
the initial response was a disinterest in intra-regional trade and a failure of 
CEFTA as a local instance of regionalism. But this is bound to radically change 
with EU membership and the more so as candidates’ economies stabilize and 
become more attractive markets as well as reliable suppliers. FDI is known to 
respond positively to such regional facilitation of market access, since critical 
mass for scale might now be accomplished by sales to a subset of  CECs rather 
than from Western Europe. 
 
The inflow of FDI is critical and sudden drops (as recently in Poland) can 
cause strain at the macro level while serving as a negative signal to business. 
However the annual volatility is not the issue. What matters is to  create and 
promote virtuous circles  over several business cycles and independent from the 
left-overs of privatisation. The overwhelming majority of FDI flows (and 
stocks) are and remain in the OECD area and there are solid reasons (such as EU 
membership and sound policies going with it) to expect the CECs to be able to 
attract a share that would contribute to growth.  The candidates should see it as 
an opportunity, a dividend that comes when investing in growth friendly 
strategies. The strong business support for enlargement invariably makes the 
point that FDI flows will remain large if such strategies are followed (ERT 
(2001); McKinsey (2002)). 
 
 
5. Migration :  perceptions and sobering analysis 
 
European integration has been the source of  Angst and false perceptions 
right from the beginning. It is no different today. French industry in 1956 was 
against the Spaak report, underlying the Rome treaty, afraid of being flooded by 
German industrial products. The German coal sector has never been part of the 
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intra-ECSC market for coal since 1952 and Germany even relied on an escape 
clause in GATT (art. 19) longer than any other country (namely, since 1958) to 
prevent non-EC coal imports. British industry was divided about the “cold 
shower” after the accession in 1973. Austrian farmers were against the CAP 
because it would offer lower (!) protection for them. All shipbuilding in the EU 
has frustrated the internal market until a decade ago.  Turning to migration, the 
Greek entry was said to prompt  “welfare tourism “, the Iberian enlargement 
would lead to  waves of immigrants into France if not all over the EC, and the 
fall of communism would send up to 10 million or more  to the West of the 
continent (The Economist spoke on the cover of the “huddled masses”).  None 
of this happened. It is crucial to understand why.  
 
In the confines of this broad survey paper it is not possible to discuss 
analytically the great debate on migration in the EU 25. As leading authors like 
Tito Boeri   (see CEPR, 2002) are the first to underline, empirical simulations 
rely on analogies with the past, usually the Mediterranean past, and might turn 
out to be a poor guide for what happens. The models employ an array of 
different methodologies. Yet what is striking is that the expected  flows, even at 
current levels of per capita income, are small by any standard. If it is true that 
Germany  - if only because networks of Central Europeans induce path 
dependency – will receive over 60 %  of these flows, the total numbers are still 
not high. But if unemployment is so high, why Germany ? Why not the five or 
six EU countries with much tighter labour markets, once migrants are uprooted 
anyway ?  Why is Austria with an unemployment rate of about half of the 
German one so pre-occupied ? 
 
The reasons clearly lie  elsewhere. A few remarks are in place, however, 
which shed a different light on the debate. First, as recent research has 
confirmed, much more attention should be paid to the motives of why workers 
do not migrate. They may (rightly) fear to have to compete with non-EU 
workers for jobs below their skill profile, expect to be discriminated  against, 
value cultural and social attachment more than we are led to believe  and, last 
but not least, appreciate the option value of waiting, in view of the medium term 
prospects of their countries. Second, relatively little is known about temporary 
migration, in the framework of  worklife strategies. Going to the West only so as 
to build up working capital for a house or a small business is much preferred and 
leads to a rather different picture than permanent migration: it would stimulate 
the sending economies via transfers and entrepreneurship and reduce the brain 
drain while pre-empting huge inflows into the West of permanent residents with 
their families. Third, the greatest shortcoming of the research wave on migration 
is that it ignores a hardcore requirement of cross-border migration in the EU, 
namely, host country control. This is a protectionist principle  depriving the poor 
worker from Central Europe the possibility to exercise his freedom to negotiate 
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his pecuniary conditions with employers. Host country control means that 
workers from Member State A  (say, Slovakia after 2004) must be paid, and 
otherwise treated as if (s)he is a worker from the host country (say Germany). 
This principle matters little between Denmark and Germany or Holland and 
Belgium and might even provide clarity in the entangled spaghetti bowl of social 
rules, so different between EU countries (especially when it comes to the 
agonizing details). But for the poor workers the principle serves as a huge 
barrier, possibly wiping out any competitive advantage the worker might have 
compared to local workers speaking German, having a familiar German 
diploma, knowing the habits and already having shelter and family networks. 
The principle reduces the discretion for a negative effect on local German wages 
to practically nil. More important still, it will throttle the potential demand for 
such workers unless sectoral or regional scarcities force employers to pay 
premia. Precisely in times of considerable unemployment  a faithful application 
of the principle cannot lead to massive demand for migrant workers.  
 
The implications of these considerations are less than pleasant. The fear of  
major inflows must therefore be based on illegal migration and the EU rules are 
irrelevant for this. Additionally, the seven years regime serves little purpose as 
long as  the host country principle is enforced. And illegal immigration can only 
be countered by effective enforcement of on-site inspections  and severe 
penalties of employers. It is far better to relax the protectionist host country 
principle, within bounds, and tie this to a temporary quota regime, thereby 
fighting illegal work much more effectively, yet also having regard to the 
benefits of the new EU members. A refusal to do so only induces greater 
incentives for illegal migration, with all the negative externalities for those 
workers and, at times, others as well.  
 
Finally, the seven years regime for Germany is one of the few exceptions. 
Several countries will immediately apply free movement  (like the Netherlands). 
It is going to be an interesting laboratory test in the Union, and for Germany, to 
observe the inflows into these countries. And  the candidates are well advised to  
behave less hypocritically. Neither Greece nor the Iberians got less than seven 
years  (and no derogations for fast moving EU members) despite the fact that the 
per capita income differentials are now (mostly) larger and, in some regions, the 
degree of deprivation after transition is much greater.   The EU regime is thus 
better than before. It would have been more useful to insist on derogations from 
the host country principle – say for ten years -  since that would have stimulated 
a measured demand for their workers that might now hardly arise in the first 
place. 
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6. Greater Euroland 
 
CECs must enter Euroland. But there is no date or calendar. There are 
three interesting implications of the entry into the eurozone: the “passage”, the 
boost to trade and the dividend via interest rates. Given space constraints I shall 
have to ignore empirical work on optimal currency area applications to Central 
Europe and several subtleties in the ongoing policy debate (see Hobza (2002) for 
a comprehensive survey). 
 
The passage to the euro for the CECs gives rise to three problems besides 
the manifold benefits of  the discipline of adhering to the stability culture of 
Euroland. First, their currencies have to pass through two years of ERM 2  and 
this could prove to be quite unsettling. Adjustable peg systems are notoriously 
unstable and, under justified as well as unjustified circumstances, can induce 
one-way bets and irrational herd behaviour. The search for “the” equilibrium 
exchange rate before entry into Euroland  may thus not only be futile but costly. 
Better keep the stay much shorter or allow ingenious evasion of the rule via 
quasi –euroisation  (see Buiter & Grafe  (2002)). For Estonia and Lithuania 
(with currency boards) it should simply be bypassed.  
 
Second, a rush into the euro seems  unwise because it is costly in terms of 
fiscal contraction for many CECs. With political will it can be done fast as Italy 
and Greece have shown. Having no immediate deadline, the CECs should 
engage in the necessary fiscal reforms of pensions and a stronger revenue base 
as well as a few other lingering issues (e.g. the social security burden) without 
the strain of a deficit ceiling of 3 %. This takes time and the short run impact on 
the budget is not completely certain. The huge investment needs of the CECs do 
not seem an argument against entry (or the discipline implied) in the light of  
expected transfers from the EU (up to 3 % of GDP or more) and the possibilities 
of private initiative for many aspects of hard infrastructure. 
 
Third, the Maastricht criterion of low inflation (1 ½  % above the lowest 
three in Euroland) is, to a modest degree, a misspecification for the CECs. The 
reason is the Balassa - Samuelson effect which is an inevitable by-product of 
catch-up growth  (and indeed neither caused by the printing press nor by 
excessive public spending). Even if the CECs cannot enter at a somewhat higher 
inflation rate  (this would require a unanimous vote to change the protocol)  they 
can, however, let the inflation rise gently in the years after entry. Differential 
inflation is no problem in a monetary union   and also no problem for the 
entrants as long as their inflation does not surpass the 2 % the ECB has set plus 
the extra inflation explained by the Balassa – Samuelson effect. Empirical 
estimates differ  (and the effect will fizzle out over time as price levels rise in 
CECs) but a range of up to 2 % seems entirely reasonable  (see  e.g. Pelkmans, 
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Gros  & Nunez Ferrer (2000) appendix  and Halpern & Wyplosz 2001)) when 
starting in 2006. Such a differential would not harm the competitiveness of the 
tradeables sector. 
 
Recent empirical work by Andrew Rose  (see Rose (2000), Rose & 
Wincoop (2001) and Rose (2001)) has suggested that the long run impact of 
currency unions is a strong increase in internal trade, perhaps up to three times. 
As yet there is no theoretical underpinning of this stunning finding. A possible 
link might exist with the so called home bias literature, also very recent, 
showing that borders remain effective in biasing trade to other home based 
agents despite free trade. When accounting for distance and language in the EU, 
home bias might still amount to a factor of 10, perhaps 14  (Head & Mayer  
(2000)). A monetary union might be pro-trade biased precisely because it does 
away with a significant border effect, particularly in the longer run. This 
possibility seems to be of even greater significance for the CECs, less well 
integrated in the trade networks of the Union and less familiar to buyers, 
consumers and intermediaries.  
 
Of course, Greater Euroland will reduce the transaction costs for the CECs 
as for current eurozone members. But in one respect the “borrowing” of 
reputation will bring a respectable bonus to them: the long run interest rate. The 
Italian example is instructive. It is said that, had Italy not joined the euro, its 
current deficit would be around 8 %, merely  because of interest payments. The 
windfall gain for Italy was the sudden substitution of the Italian long interest 
rate for the eurozone one. A similar effect can be expected for CECs, in various 
degrees, be it that their degree of indebtedness is much lower. It will also have a 
beneficial effect on private investment which is exactly what is needed when 
otherwise the entry might lead to  a restrictive fiscal climate. The reputation of 
the ECB as the hard core of an explicitly codified stability culture might perhaps 
be endangered if, say by 2008, another 10 countries would have joined its 
Governing Council, with its one-country-one-vote system. The ten candidates do 
not  have deeply-rooted stability cultures and might have incentives to take a 
more relaxed view on what  “price stability  “  should mean. Therefore, timely 
ECB reform, adopting a new decision-making procedure more or less like the 
Federal Reserve, would be good for credibility. In turn, it would ensure the 
interest rate bonus to be sizeable.  
 
The big question remains whether early entry is good or bad. Balcerowicz, 
the president of the central bank of Poland, favours quick entry but his argument 
is political: it would impose structural reforms  and once they are done, 
disinflation would be less costly and growth might go up more easily. Clearly, 
this is a gamble and may well fail. The EU favours a go-slow approach and this 
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seems well – advised. Forcing structural reforms, whether for monetary union or 
for growth or for employment, is always politically difficult.  
 
 
7.   EU reforms for a healthy enlargement   
 
Enlargement has ignited a reform debate with three pet topics of 
economists. It looks as if the reformers will not enjoy great harvests on all three 
fronts: the reform of the CAP before enlargement, the reform of cohesion widely 
defined also before enlargement, and the reform of labour markets and possibly 
social policy. Of course there are good arguments to pursue reforms of this kind 
without enlargement. The enlargement adds urgency, at least from a detached 
economic point of view.  
 
CAP reform is essentially a political game, with economic analysis and 
the overall public interest at best on the backburner. Since the Berlin European 
Council in 1999 trivialized the reform process by once again ring-fencing the 
dairy and sugar sectors for six years, reducing the price proposals and sharply 
reducing the digression in the income compensations  (see Nunez Ferrer & 
Emerson, 2000, for a detailed analysis), the political game is boiling down to 
pursuing reform-promises-after-enlargement. Sadly enough, the interaction 
between the Commission with its seemingly discriminatory proposals for 
income compensations  and the outrage in Central Europe has fueled a political 
dynamism which completely misses the essential issue for the CAP and its 
transfers in the larger Union. The pro-reform group of four Member States 
(Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK) are all net payers and do not hide 
this in their advocacy which, again, is not the central issue. The crucial issue is 
that the export of the conventional CAP, with generous income payments even 
when somewhat further decoupled from production, will go against long run 
catch-uo growth for Central Europe. Rather than focussing on the interests of the 
farmers, the real issue is to focus on two aspects:  the overall economic effects  
(hence, price hikes for consumers, rise in land prices, slow exit from the zero-
productivity segments of agriculture, etc.) and the long run. Public choice 
explains why politicians find these two concerns quite unattractive. The 
counterpart in the EU-15 is of course that digression in income compensations 
ought to be restored and that, when sugar and milk reforms are finally tackled, 
the compensations will be truly digressive over a relatively short time span. This 
would also take the discriminatory sting out of the negatiations in the end game. 
Reforms after enlargement are simply not credible, if only because the coalition 
to preserve as much as possible from the CAP risks to be bolstered. And, lest it 
be forgotten, two factors weaken the threat effect of the net payers: the extra 
costs of enlargement are not so large  (much lower than estimates of a few years 
ago) and remain within the 1.27 % of the EU GDP; and the new US farm act  
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and the aggressive use of it by Washington D.C.  remove a good deal of the hard 
pressure in Geneva. Finally, there is a serious risk that the desire to promote 
“biological  “  agriculture by minister Kuenast and others creates a new demand 
for protectionism  which can be cleverly combined with the “old” agro-
protection in a political deal that would be presented as a “modernisation”. The 
chances for CAP reform, and better still for CAP reform in the best interests of 
the candidate countries, therefore are pretty dim.   
  
Is it any different with cohesion and the structural funds? To some 
degree it is. Cohesion is more self-policing in the long run since catching up 
(like Ireland and some regions in Spain) ends support. Indeed, cohesion is 
efficiency based:   it is to help catch-up growth until the disparities have been 
overcome.   In this sense it is not a traditional instance of redistribution because 
that is first of all an expression of solidarity, hence permanent and 
unconditional. If Spain   (and since four years Greece) continues to perform as 
they have recently, the cohesion issue will shrink to two or three regions of these 
countries rather soon. However, this favourable medium-run perspective is 
largely ignored in the political debate. The cohesion debate suffers from double 
standards: on the one hand, there is political addiction to the transfers; on the 
other hand, once the transfers have been fixed in the medium-term financial 
perspective of the Union, the emphasis of policy makers shifts to selected 
success stories  and a sense of pride in achieving real convergence. Spain is 
reasonably successful but, in the run up to new budget decisions for the EU-25, 
its campaign is entirely focused on how to keep the same transfers despite its 
accomplishments. 
 
 Irrespective of the genuine effectiveness of these funds, the political 
salience is such that old cohesion countries are pitted against new cohesion 
countries as long as  the rich EU – 11 intends not to pay more in total. Reforms 
are needed so as to achieve much better focus  (only the truly poor should 
receive transfers, so no regions from the EU – 11) and greater equity  (scaling 
transfers according to the income gap with the EU average). But, more 
intrusively, should “Brussels” pay for extra unemployment caused by the refusal 
of labour unions and social ministers to attune regional wages to regional 
productivity, which, in weaker regions, can be drastically lower  ?  The evidence 
(e.g. Faini (1999) and  Mauro, Prasad  & Spilimbergo (1999), not to speak of  
East Germany) is strong that the disparities in unemployment (greater than in 
per capita income) are largely due to these rigidities. But will these pleas for 
reform be supported and realized ? 
 
The reforms of labour markets are an evergreen amongst European 
economists. It ranges from   Giersch’  ‘eurosclerose’ of 20 years ago until the 
recent, sensational call by a CEPR team led by  prof. Boeri  (CEPR  (2002)) to 
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make accession conditional upon the existence of  a decent social safety net  
while at the same time letting the EU contributing to this net via the structural 
funds. The Boeri group goes even further  and argues for a European safety net 
(!), based on a European minimum guaranteed-income scheme (which would be 
differentiated, to be sure) so that systems competition would only take place 
above that level. I shall not go into the merits and financing  of those systems  
nor into the details of all kinds     of labour market flexibility proposals floated 
by many economists, the EU and the OECD.  The Luxemburg process,  dealing 
with the so-called European employment strategy  since 1998, has attempted to 
approach it via the so-called ‘open method of coordination ‘. One observes that 
all the hard reform issues remain excluded from the work. The benchmarking 
has done little to convince German or Italian vested interests to mend their ways. 
Would enlargement make the difference ?  The answer is that only a 
combination of three changes might get Europe somewhere: making intra-EU 
labour mobility across borders easier  (a topic carefully  neglected until in 2001 
the Commission finally came with serious suggestions to remove barriers to 
cross-border labour mobility -  se  European Commission, 2001),  greater 
flexibility with the host country control principle, and  some acceptance of the 
fundamental idea that  the cumulation of regulatory  protection in the labour and 
a generous safety net  without any trade – off  between the two can be excessive 
and hence hinder the attainment  of goals  that the EU (hence its Member States 
!) have set. If this triptich is not accepted   - and it will be an uphill struggle  -  
chances are that, gradually, Central Europe will transform into a copy of 
Western Europe. The upshot will be sluggish growth in the continent  while  
labour markets will fail to clear. If this agenda could even be partially 
implemented, as about half of the  EU countries are favouring and are already 
doing to a degree, enlargement might infuse some extra dynamism. 
 
 
8.   Conclusion 
  
  The economic implications of enlargement can be divided into the 
traditional, trade driven effects, whether static or dynamic, and the consequences 
of what amounts to regime change, both West and East, at national level and for 
the EU at large. It  provides us with a range of tremendous opportunities, yet 
equally much with a range of strategies for conservation. It is possible to belittle 
enlargement  - after all, the economic weight of the ten CEECs is a mere 5 % of 
the Union’s GDP. The opposite is practised too, that is, to regard enlargement as 
the trigger to reform the Union, and in one breath some ill-considered national 
policies and regulations  as well. Unfortunately, what is to be reformed covers 
precisely those areas in an otherwise quite healthy Community which are 
exceptionally reform-resistent.  
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The trade effects outside agriculture  have largely been realized since 
industrial free trade is already enjoyed and external tariffs are not very high, 
indeed often low. However, it is crucial not to focus too much on the static 
welfare effects. Enlargement is really about a long run to higher prosperity 
through restructuring, relocation, upgrading of products and skills, development 
of services as inputs for industry and intersectoral labour mobility. In such a 
richer view modelling might be less helpful but the trade / FDI nexus can serve 
as a steady engine of growth. Other beneficial effects such as the reduction of 
risk premia given macro-economic stability prompted by “lock-in” should not be 
ignored. Little is known about the future impact of the larger internal market for 
services but, given the low productivity of services and the absence (as yet) of 
tradeability, competitive exposure and new opportunities are bound to induce 
significant positive effects. Also. little attention seems to have been given to the 
liberalisation of intra- CEEC trade, some one and a half decade after the demise 
of Comecon. Again, these opportunities ought to be added. 
 
The thrust of enlargement, however, is “regime change “.  There is little 
doubt, and empirical evidence in the transition literature, that the lock-in effects 
of preparing for EU membership have been and still are extremely positive. The 
occasional policy reversals are inevitably corrected and relatively strong and 
gradually more credible market and policy institutions are rapidly developed. 
The economic implications of enlargement, once studied as aspects following 
from “regime change “,  provide policy makers with a much more relevant and 
richer picture for the design of long run strategies both in the EU circuit and in 
the capitals of the candidates. 
 
This BEEP briefing  discusses the crucial importance of catch-up growth  
and both the positive influence the EU acquis exercises  as well as the profound 
difficulties economists have in advising more detailed strategies to “ensure “ a 
steady path of catch-up. It paints a relatively positive picture for the future 
attractiveness of Central Europe for inflows of FDI, even in a global climate in 
which overall outflows of FDI have shrunk. The briefing attempts to call 
attention to a different way of looking at migration which strongly suggests that 
migration flows in the EU-25 will not be sizeable, at least not the legal ones. 
The EU principle of host country control is, however, unnecessarily strict, and 
thereby adds a major incentive for illegal flows. The win-win advantages for a 
flexible approach to this principle have unfortunately been ignored. The entry of 
the candidates into euroland  is seen as relatively unproblematic, if a cool 
analysis of the risks of a hasty, early entry guides the decision makers and if 
today’s euroland accommodates justified reservations to go through, or to stay 
too long in, ERM II.   The Balassa/ Samuelson effect can be easily 
accomodated, without any threat to the accomplished stability culture of 
euroland. The benefits of getting into euroland for the candidate countries are 
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likely to be considearble. Finally, enlargement is viewed as a leverage for at 
least three reforms, long on the hitlist of many economists in the EU.  
Enlargement is not the reason in and by itself for these reforms but it adds 
urgency. EU policy makers should take these reform pleas much more serious. It 
is argued, however, that the reform resistence in  these areas has deep political 
roots and indeed may well be rational as suggested by theories of collective 
action or public choice. Given the limited economic weight, at least still today,  
of the candidates, it is not easily to be expected that the leverage factor of 
enlargement for those reforms is high. In the light of the vague but inspiring aim 
of the Lisbon process of the EU, indeed the larger EU, of becoming a high-
performance economy unmatched by any in the world, the reforms may well 
have a greater prospect over the medium run, not least because accommodation 
may then be less painful. 
 
 
 21
 
Literature references  
_____________________ 
 
ADB (1997), Emerging Asia, changes and challenges, Manila, Asian 
Development Bank 
 
ADB (1999), Asian Development Outlook 1999, Oxford/New York 
(Oxford University Press) 
 
Aturupane, C.,Djankov, S. & Hoekman, B, (1999), Horizontal and vertical 
intra-industry trade between Eastern Europe and the EU, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 135, Heft 1 
 
Baldwin, R., Francois, J. & Porter, R. (1997), The costs and benefits of 
enlargement: the impact on the EU and Central Europe, Economic Policy, 
No. 24, October  
 
Bevan, A. & Estrin, S. (2000), The determinants of foreign direct 
investment in transition economies, London, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 
2638, December  
 
Brenton, P. (1999), Trade and investment in Europe: the impact of the 
next enlargement, Brussels, CEPS  
 
Brenton, P. & di Mauro, F. (1999), The potential magnitude and impact of 
FDI inflows to CEECs, Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 14, 1 
 
Breuss, F. (1999), Costs and benefits of EU enlargement in model 
simulations, Vienna, Research Institute for European Affairs, University 
of Economics and Business, Working Paper 33 
 
Buiter, W. & Grafe, C. (2002), Anchor, float or abandon ship: exchange 
rate regimes for accession countries, London, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 
3184, Januari 
 
Campos, N. (2000), The growth prospects of transition economies 
reconsidered, Bonn, Center for European Integration Studies, ZEI 
Working Paper  B00-13  
 
CEPR (2002), Who’s afraid of the Big Enlargement ?, London, CEPR 
Policy Paper no. 7, June  
 
 22
Daianu, D. (2002), Is catching up possible in Europe ?, Romanian Journal 
of European Affairs, Vol. 2, 1  
 
Eggleston, K, (1997), The sustainability of East Asian growth, ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, Vol, 14, 1, July 
 
EPPA/CEPS (2002), [ study for the German Textile Confederation on the 
impact of the 2005 removal of quotas of the MFA ] [ to be published ], 
Brussels 
 
ERT (1999), The East-West win-win business experience, Brussels, 
European Round Table of Industrialists 
 
ERT (2001), Opening up the business opportunities of EU enlargement, 
Brussels, European Round Table of Industrialists, ERT position paper and 
analysis 
 
European Commission (2001), The economic impact of enlargement, DG 
EcFin, Enlargement Papers no. 4, June, pp. 1 – 64 
 
European Commission (2001), New European labour markets, open to all, 
with access for all, COM (2001)  106  of 1 March 2001 
 
European Commission (2002a), Enlargement and agriculture: successfully 
integrating the new Member States into the CAP, Issues Paper, SEC 
(2002) 95 of 30 January 2002 
 
European Commission (2002b), Analysis of the impact on Agricultural 
markets and incomes of EU enlargement to the CEECs, March, working 
paper  
 
European Commission (2002c), Information Note, Common Financial 
Framework 2004 – 2006 for the Accession Negotiations, Brussels, SEC 
(2002) 102 of 30 January 
 
Faini, R. (1999), Trade unions and regional development, European 
Economic Review, Vol. 43, 2, February   
 
Francois, J. (1998), Scale economies, imperfect competition and the 
Eastern expansion of the EU, In: Brockmeier, S. et al., ed.s, Economic 
transition and the greening of policies, Kiel, Wirtschaftverlag Vauk, pp. 
74 – 90 
 
 23
Frandsen, S.,Jensen, H. & Vanzetti, D. (2000), Expanding Fortress 
Europe: agricultural trade and welfare implications of European 
enlargement for non- Member regions, The World Economy, March (Vol. 
23, 3) 
 
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. & Venables, A. (1999), The spatial economy, 
Cambridge (US) and London, MIT Press 
 
Fuller, F., Beghin, J., Fabiosa, J., Mohanty, S., Fang, C. & Kaus, P. 
(2002), Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the 
European Union: impacts on agricultural markets, The World Economy, 
March (Vol. 25, 3) 
 
Halpern, L. & Wyplosz, C. (2001), Economic transformation and the real 
exchange rates in the 2000s: the Balassa/Samuelson connection, 
Economic Survey of Europe, no. 2001  no. 1, Geneva, UN-ECE, chapter 6,  
pp. 227 – 239 
 
Head, R. & Mayer, T. (2000), Non-Europe: the magnitude and causes of 
market fragmentation in the EU, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 126, 
Heft 2 
 
Hobza, A. (2002), CEE candidate countries on the way to the eurozone, 
The Hague, WRR Working Document   (forthcoming October), 
www.wrr.nl  
 
IBRD (1993), The East Asian Miracle, New York, Oxford University 
Press, for the World Bank 
 
Kaminsky, B. (2001), How accession to the EU has affected external trade 
and foreign direct investment in Central European economies, World 
Bank, Washington D.C., Working Paper 
 
Keuschnigg, C. & Kohler, W. (1999), Eastern enlargement of the EU: 
economic costs and benefits for the EU, study for the European 
Commission 
 
Lejour, A., Mooij, R. de  & Nahuis, R. (2001), EU enlargement: economic 
implications for countries and industries, The Hague, CPB Document no. 
011, September, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
 
 24
Mauro, P., Prasad, E. & Spilimbergo, A. (1999), Perspectives on regional 
unemployment in Europe, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 177, Washington 
D.C. 
 
McKinsey  (2002), Business consequences of EU enlargement, major 
change or non-event ?, Brussels, report for the European Business 
Summit, June 
 
Morrisey, O. & Nelson, D. (1998), East Asian economic performance: 
miracle or just a pleasant surprise ?, The World Economy, Vol. 21, 7, 
September  
 
Neary, P. (2001),  Of hype and hyperboles: introducing the new economic 
geography, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, 2 (June), pp. 536 - 
561 
 
Nielsen, J. (2000), Price – quality competition in the exports of the 
CEECs, Intereconomics, March/April, Vol. 35, 2, pp. 94 – 101 
 
Nunuz Ferrer, J. & Emerson, M (2000), Good Bye Agenda 2000, Hello 
Agenda 2003, CEPS Working Document no. 140, CEPS, Brussels 
 
OECD (1998), The competitiveness of transition economies, Proceedings 
in cooperation with WIFO and WIIW, Paris 
 
Pelkmans, J., Gros, D. & Nunez Ferrer, J. (2000), Long run economic 
aspects of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, The Hague, WRR Working 
Document no. 109, pp. 207   
 
Porter, M. & Christensen, C. (1999), Microeconomic competitiveness: 
findings from the 1999 executive survey, Davos/ Geneva, World 
Economic Forum Competitiveness Report 1999, pp. 30 – 52 
 
Rosati, D. (2000), Macroeconomic development in Poland and the 
accession process, Laxemburg, IIASA, unpublished paper 
 
Rose, A. (2000), One money, one market: the effect of common 
currencies on trade, Economic Policy, no. 30 
 
Rose, A. (2001), Currency unions and trade: the effect is large, Economic 
Policy, no. 33, October   
 
 25
Rose, A. & Wincoop, E. van (2001), National money as a barrier to trade: 
the real case for currency union, American Economic Review, May, Vol. 
91, 2  
 
Swinnen, J. (2002), Transition and integration in Europe: implications for 
agricultural and food markets, policy and trade agreements, The World 
Economy, April (Vol. 25, 2) 
 
UN-ECE (2001), Economic Survey Of Europe, 2001 no 1, Geneva, UN 
Economic Commission for Europe 
 
Weise, C. (2002), How to finance Eastern enlargement of the EU ?, 
Berlin, DIW, Discussion Paper 287, June  
 
Weyerbrock, S. (1998), Reform of the EU’s CAP: how to reach GATT 
compatibility ?, European Economic Review, February (Vol. 42, 2) 
WRR (2001), Towards a pan-European Union, report no. 59,  The Hague, 
SDU Publishers  
